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Abstract 
Social media can be a double-edged sword for society, either as a convenient channel 
exchanging ideas or as an unexpected conduit circulating fake news through a large 
population. While existing studies of fake news focus on theoretical modeling of 
propagation or identification methods based on machine learning, it is important to 
understand the realistic mechanisms between theoretical models and black-box 
methods. Here we track large databases of fake news and real news in both, Weibo in 
China and Twitter in Japan from different culture, which include their complete traces 
of re-postings. We find in both online social networks that fake news spreads 
distinctively from real news even at early stages of propagation, e.g. five hours after 
the first re-postings. Our finding demonstrates collective structural signals that help to 
understand the different propagation evolution of fake news and real news. Different 
from earlier studies, identifying the topological properties of the information 
propagation at early stages may offer novel features for early detection of fake news 
in social media. 
  
Introduction 
Social networks such as Twitter or Weibo, involving billions of users around the 
world, have tremendously accelerated the exchange of information and thereafter 
have led to fast polarization of public opinion [1]. For example, there is a large 
amount of fake news about the 3.11 earthquake in Japan, where about 80 thousand 
people have been involved in both diffusion and correction [2]. These fake news, 
which can be fabricated stories or statements yet without confirmation, circulate 
online pervasively through the conduit offered by on-line social networks. Without 
proper debunking and verification, the fast circulation of fake news can largely 
reshape public opinion and undermine modern society [3]. Even worse, fake news can 
be intentionally fabricated, leading to diverse threats to modern society including 
turmoil or riot. The later fake news is revealed and corrected the greater the damage it 
can make, due to its fast propagation. Thus, detecting fake news at their early stages, 
in order to effectively avoid further risks and damages, is crucial.  
 
Different from the age of word of mouth, identification of fake news in online social 
network by experts is generally labor-intensive with low efficiency and accuracy [4], 
which has attracted much research attention to provide alternative solutions. One 
intuitive idea for understanding fake news spreading is inspired by epidemic models. 
In 1960s, Daley and Kendall proposed the so-called DK model [5] in which agents are 
divided into ignorant, spreader and stifle. Its later extensions include the known 
epidemic spreading models such as SIS model [6, 7], SIR model [8, 9], SI model [10, 
11] and SIRS model [12]. While these studies focus on theoretical modeling of fake 
news propagation, availability of real data in online social platforms, as we show here, 
can provide an opportunity to deepen our understanding for the realistic information 
cascades. Different kinds of observations have been made in empirical studies of fake 
news, including linguistic features [13], temporal features of re-postings [14-16] and 
user profiles [17-19]. Actually, information cascades in online social networks are 
collective propagation networks of which critical topological features remain yet 
unknown. This motivates our present study to analyze and compare empirically 
between propagation networks of fake and real news, especially in their early stage, 
so as to identify the propagation differences and mechanisms behind. These 
topological features could help to design machine learning approaches to essentially 
boost the accuracy of fake news targeting [20-22]. 
 
Very recently, based on empirical datasets, it has been found that the propagation 
network of fake news is different from that of real news [23]. They have found that 
falsehood propagates significantly farther, faster, deeper, and broader than truth news 
in many categories of information. While this study provides the possibility to 
differentiate fake news from real news based on propagation network, it remains 
unclear how this difference between fake news and real news emerge and how soon 
one can separate these two types. Thus, a systematic study for dynamic evolution of 
propagation topology is still missing. This motivated us to explore deeper in this 
direction of how the propagation evolves topologically in different scenarios. With 
collected real data, we identified early signals for identifying fake news, at five hours 
from the first re-posting, without other information on contents or users. Note that 
different from considering all the cascade components [23], our finding is valid for 
even only following the largest cascade component.  
 
Based on realistic traces of real and fake news propagation in both Weibo (from 
China) and Twitter (from Japan), we use the re-posting relationships between 
different users to establish propagation networks. For definition and sampling 
methods see Methods. With topological signals at different scales, we find that fake 
news show significant differences from real news. These novel topological features 
will enable us to design an efficient algorithm to distinguish between fake news and 
real news even shortly after their birth.  
 
Results 
To construct propagation network of fake and real news, we utilize the re-posting 
relation between different users participating in circulating the same message (see 
Methods). A schematic description of such propagation networks is shown in Fig. 1A. 
Typical propagation networks of fake news and real news in Weibo and Twitter are 
demonstrated in Fig. 1B-E. The topology of propagation network of fake news and 
real news can be seen to be different. For example, the number of layers in fake news 
(Fig. 1B and 1D) is typically larger than that of real news (Fig. 1C and 1E). 
Additionally, from looking at various examples of fake news propagation networks, it 
is somewhat surprising that for widely distributed fake news, the creator does not 
usually have the largest degree in the propagation network (Fig. S1 and S2). In the 
following, our analysis considers also real news created by non-official sources, to 
avoid the artificial differences due to different types of information creators (official 
or non-official accounts).  
 
Layer ratio. The layer number is defined as the numbers of hops from the creator for 
a given propagation network. The cumulative numbers of nodes at different layers as 
a function of time for four typical networks of fake news (Fig. 2A for Weibo and 2C 
for Twitter) and real news (Fig. 2B for Weibo and 2D for Twitter) are demonstrated. 
The fraction of re-postings in the first layer of fake news network is found 
significantly smaller than that of real news, while the fraction in other layers for fake 
news is significantly larger than that of real news. Early adopters re-posting the 
message shortly after the creator play dominant role in circulating real news 
comparatively. These different roles lead to distinctive landscapes of propagation 
networks.  
 
The investigation of layer sizes in propagation networks demonstrated in Fig. 2, are 
systematically extended to all the available messages. As shown in Fig. 3A and 3B, 
fake news networks tend to possess a relatively smaller first layer, while other layers 
are larger comparatively. Therefore, we can define the ratio of layer size as the ratio 
between size of the second and the first layer. As shown in ratio distribution (Fig. 3C 
and 3D), the ratio in fake news is significantly larger than that of real news. The 
distribution for ratio of layer sizes separates fake and real news well with only a small 
overlapped area. Furthermore, it is seen in Fig. 3C that this difference is already 
significant only at five hours since the first re-posting. In Fig. 3D, it is seen that, for 
the whole lifespan, the separation of the fake and the real is also significant. In 
circulation of fake news, the success of the propagation depends highly on the 
branching process creating different layers, which show different evolution paths 
between fake and real news. We further investigate the probability difference between 
fake and real news based on distributions of layer ratio from the time of first 
re-posting (Fig. S3 and S4). Note that the layer size distribution has a peak around 
layer four in twitter in Fig. 3B, probably due to secondary outbreaks. 
 
It should be noted that while ordinary users post fake news, real news is more 
probable to be created by official accounts such as government agencies or mass 
media. In order to eliminate the possible impact of official creators, we also 
investigate the distribution of ratio of layer sizes in real news with non-official 
creators. While official news and non-official news have different sample size here, 
we found they share similar propagation patterns. For example, in Fig. 3C and 3D, all 
the real news and non-official real news are found to have close distribution of layer 
size ratio. To verify our results, we also analyze data of 2000 more real news with 
non-official accounts from another dataset shown in Fig. S5 and S6. The distributions 
of real news in different dataset are similar yet distinct from that of fake news. 
 
Characteristic distance. While the ratio of layer sizes can be regard as a local feature 
of the network structure, we further inspect a global feature in terms of characteristic 
distance in a propagation network. As seen in Fig. 4A, distances between pairs of 
nodes in fake news are in general longer than those of real news, implying that later 
adopters foster the penetration of fake news in social networks. In order to quantify 
this finding for all the networks, we propose a second measure called characteristic 
distance (a) shown in Fig. 4B (see Methods). Considering the characteristic distance 
of all the networks as in Fig. 4B, fake news possesses a significantly longer 
characteristic distance (4.26) than that of real news (2.59). Similar results can also be 
observed in Twitter propagations (Fig. 4C). The distributions of characteristic 
distances for all networks are shown in Fig. 4D, where the two curves of fake and real 
news are well separated. Different from results in [23], we found the size distributions 
between fake and real news could be similar (Fig. S7), while the characteristic 
distance is significantly different between fake news and real news. We also verified 
that propagation size has few correlation with the characteristic distance (Fig. S8). To 
verify our results, we also analyze data of 2000 more real news from another dataset 
shown in Figs. S5. 
 
Structural Heterogeneity. Network topology describes the geometry of connections, 
with more information embedded than the scale statistics in [23]. Here we measure 
the Heterogeneity (see Methods) between propagation networks in fake and real news. 
The parameter h reflects the difference between a given propagation network and its 
counterpart of a star network with the same size. Network with smaller h means 
similar to star network. Although the out-degree distribution demonstrates only minor 
difference between fake news and real news (Fig. S9), it is interestingly found here 
that the topology heterogeneity is significantly distinguishable. Note that the 
relationship between heterogeneity and N for star networks is power-law as seen in 
Fig. 5A. The h is the difference between the logarithm of a real network heterogeneity 
value Hr  and the logarithm of heterogeneity value of the same size star network Hs . 
The parameter h of fake news is significantly larger compared to that of real news. 
Consistent findings can also be observed in Twitter (Fig. 5B). In order to quantify the 
heterogeneity systematically, two distributions of h considering different time 
intervals are calculated. In Fig. 5C, it shows significant difference at five hours from 
the first re-posting. For the whole propagation lifespan in Fig. 5D, h of fake news is 
also significantly larger than that of real news. Fake news networks have typically 
lower heterogeneity (larger h) since their propagation involves few dominant 
broadcasters. On the contrary, real news demonstrates higher heterogeneity (smaller h) 
and more star-like layout. The ability to distinguish fake news from real ones is also 
valid for real news posted by non-official users (Fig. S5 and S10). This implies that 
the indicator based on degree heterogeneity is independent of the type of creator. 
Additionally, another measure named Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI [24]), shows 
also distinction between fake news and real news (Fig. S11).  
 
The distinction between fake and real news of the heterogeneity measure is the 
highest among the above three indicators as seen in Fig. 6 and Table 2. For a given 
Weibo network, measuring its h provides a clear difference between fake news and 
real news (Fig. 6A), even only considering re-postings at five hours from the first 
re-posting. This identification becomes even sharper in Fig. 6B, when we consider all 
re-postings. We show in Fig. 6C the difference significance (see Methods) between 
fake news and real news for different h. The differences are about 76% and 79% 
respectively for re-postings at a relatively short time (five hours) and all re-postings. 
Note that the probability of being fake news at five hours is already very similar to 
that for the whole propagation lifespan. The verification analysis (shown in Fig. S5 
and S6) also demonstrates the significant difference between fake news and real news 
with a different dataset, which is fully published by non-official account. Our results 
suggest that even without sophisticated features like texts or user profiles, direct and 
understandable topological features can offer high significance for developing early 
detections.  
 
Discussion 
Being the most vital and popular form of new media, online social networks, 
fundamentally enhance the creation and dissemination of fake news [25, 26]. Though 
existing solutions, especially the inspired machine learning approaches, perform 
impressively on targeting fake news, their black-box style essentially prevents a solid 
understanding and corresponding method development of debunking or blocking false 
information. In the other way, human intensive labor approach is time consuming and 
expensive. For example, it usually takes at least three days [4] for verification and 
therefore misses the optimal prevention window before massive spreading. In this 
sense, novel approaches that could help to identify fake news at early stages are 
urgently needed in preventing the negative impact of false information on modern 
society.  
 
We show here that fake news spread with a very different network topology, even at 
early stages, from authentic messages. We focus, in this manuscript on the evolution 
differences between the propagation topology of two types of information at early 
stages rather than providing a comprehensive prediction approach [22]. Even taking 
only one feature, the difference between fake news and real news is significant. The 
propagation mechanism, which essentially couples information dynamics and 
collective cognition in social networks, results in a distinctive landscape of 
circulations between fake and real news. In this way, several early signals can be 
derived, including the layer-ratio, the characteristic distance and the heterogeneity. 
Different from sophisticated and time-consuming features that have been considered 
in contemporary solutions, our suggested measures are simple, understandable, and 
time-efficient. For example, the weak heterogeneity of fake news might be the result 
of opinion competition from weak ties between social communities. As stated that 
“bad” is usually more influential than “good” [27], the unconsciousness of 
“negative-bias” might result in late burst of fake news, which essentially differs from 
the spread of real ones. Disclosing intelligence factors that generate the specific 
topological features we found here can be a promising research direction in the future. 
 
Note that our study has several major differences from Vosoughi et al. [23]. We focus 
more on the topological features (shape of network), rather than on scale measures of 
propagation networks (depth or width). Furthermore, we focus on the largest cascade 
component of propagation network, while all the cascade components are considered 
in [23]. As both manuscripts confirm the difference between fake news and real news 
in different aspects, we surprisingly find that this difference can be very significant 
even at the early stages of propagation.  
  
Methods 
Weibo data preprocessing. We analyze 1,701 fake news of Weibo propagation 
networks (with 973,391 users) and 492 real news of Weibo propagation networks 
(with 347,401 users) that spread on Weibo from 2011 to 2016. We choose here large 
networks with more than 200 tweets. More details are given in Table 1. The topics of 
these Weibo propagation networks include political fake news, economic fake news, 
fraudulent fake news, tidbit fake news and pseudoscience fake news. (Fig. S12). 
 
The retweeting traces of fake news and real news are thoroughly collected through 
Weibo’s open APIs [28]. Fake news is officially investigated and confirmed by the 
platform of Weibo [29]. Regarding real news, we collect them directly from reliable 
Weibo accounts. Creators of the real news can be official accounts, for example, 
government accounts and on-line newspaper accounts. All these real news accounts 
have been officially verified by the platform of Weibo. On the other hand, we also 
select manually 51 out of 492 real news networks whose creators are not official 
accounts. To verify our results, we analyze more data (2000 more real news) from 
Weibo in the Fig. S5 and S6. These 2000 real news are collected by the same way as 
above, while these 2000 real news are not official accounts.  
 
In order to create the network, in which nodes are users of Weibo and links are 
re-postings, we first mine the following data both for fake and real news: 
(a) Users: the unique serial number of users who participate in the same network. We 
also mark the node of the network creator. 
(b) Re-postings: the unique serial number of directed re-posting activities, and the 
serial number of source users and reposted users of this re-posting. 
 
Twitter data (a validation dataset) preprocessing. We analyze 27 fake news of 
Twitter networks (with 105,335 users) and 28 real news of Twitter networks (with 
133,109 users). We choose here large networks with more than 200 tweets. More 
details are given in Table 1. 
Twitter data was collected from Japanese tweets posted during the period between 
2011/3/11 and 2011/3/17 during the Great East Japan earthquake period. In this 
period, much fake news propagated in the Japanese Twitter. For fake news, we first 
gathered 57 topics listed on the website [30]. The contents include tweets with no 
evidence and malicious tweets, such as starvation of baby and elderly people, 
someone under the server rack needed help, and the Japan prime minister was taking 
luxury supper during the disaster. When collecting tweets, we combine a few 
keywords related to the contents of each fake news. These keywords were proper 
nouns, such as place names and personal names. After that, we excluded correction 
tweets whose contents are against fake news including keywords such as "false" and 
"mistake". Typical procedure to gather fake news is explained in [2]. 
 
For real news, we gathered 71 topics by combining keywords (proper nouns, such as 
place names and personal names) as the fake news. We collected most of tweets 
originated from official accounts with verified Twitter badges such as government 
agencies, major newspapers and famous people. The contents included tweets about 
earthquake information, traffic information, donation information and so on. In 
addition, we also collect five topics originated from civilians without badges, which 
were widely retweeted. These tweet contents were related to small real tips during the 
disaster.  
 
After gathering fake and real news tweet on a keyword basis, we focused on those 
with more than 200 tweets to create retweet network. We created retweet networks by 
using the mention symbol "@" in the tweets as a trigger. Because account name 
(username) of Twitter cannot be longer than 15 characters and can only contain 
alphanumeric characters (letters A-Z, numbers 0-9) except for underscores [31], we 
extracted those strings that consist of 2 to 12 characters after “@” as account names. 
Note that we skipped the account names of one character because it rarely appeared in 
Japanese Twitter space, and often appeared as the usage of emoticons such as “@ _ @ 
(surprised face expression).” Furthermore, since there is no distinction between 
uppercase and lowercase letters in account name rules, all account names were 
converted to lowercase letters to proceed. 
 
If there are multiple “@” in one tweet, according to the above rules, we extracted 
multiple account names as much as possible and linked them in order from the 
beginning of the sentence to create the networks. Basically, from one tweet, there 
exists only one account that retweeted previously. However, tweets were often deleted 
afterwards in particular fake news, and the network was segregated by this approach. 
Therefore, by going back to clues in the remaining tweets, we create the network by 
extracting as much accounts as possible from one tweet. 
 
We create networks with the node as an account name and the link as a connection at 
the mention symbol “@” with the above rules. We extract the largest connected 
component (LCC) with no consideration of link directions, and analyze only those 
with LCC size above roughly 200 nodes. Account names with the oldest tweet time in 
LCC were treated as creators. 
 
Definition of fake news and real news. In recent paper by Lazer et al. [32], “fake 
news” is defined as fabricated information that mimics news media content in form, 
without news media’s editorial norms and processes for ensuring the accuracy and 
credibility of information. In our manuscript with Weibo data, the fake news is false 
information fact-checked by the platform and verified as having been fabricated. 
Regarding real news, we collect them directly from reliable Weibo accounts. And all 
these real news accounts have been officially verified by the platform of Weibo. For 
Twitter data, the fake news is also false information fact-checked by reliable platform 
[30]. This is similar as the true/false news defined in paper by S. Vosoughi et al. [23]. 
And their fake news cascades are checked independently by six fact-checking 
organizations (snopes.com, politifact.com, factcheck.org, truthorfiction.com, 
hoax-slayer.com, and urbanlegends.about.com). 
 
Establishing a network model. Based on the information we analyze above, we 
establish a directed network as demonstrated in Fig. 1A. The users are the nodes in 
the network, and the re-postings are the edges in network. And we mark network 
creator using color green. Each edge has a direction which is either from creator to 
re-poster or from former re-poster to latest re-poster. After modeling, we could plot 
figures of typical networks for both fake and real news of Weibo and Twitter as 
shown in Fig. 1B to 1E. 
 
Ratio of layer sizes. The layer number is defined as the numbers of hops of 
re-postings from the creator. The ratio of layer sizes is a measure for each network 
defined as: 
                         2
1
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                      (1) 
1n  and 2n are the sizes (number of nodes) of the first and second layer for a certain 
network respectively. 
 
Characteristic distances. In order to measure the distances, for each network we first 
calculate the distances between all pairs of nodes in the network, and plot the 
distribution in a logarithmic scale (y axis). It can be seen from Fig. 4 that the function 
can be approximated by an exponential function. We consider linear part of curves 
where their x value (distance) is above one. We calculate the characteristic distance (𝑎) 
accordingly: 
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Heterogeneity measure. The heterogeneity [33] is defined as: 
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N : The number of nodes in the network 
ik : The degree of node   
We show a scatter plot (Fig. 5A) for both fake and real news of Weibo. The black line 
is the theoretical line for star network:  
 Heterogeneous ~ N
                      
(4) 
The h is the difference between the logarithm of a real network heterogeneity value 
Hr  and the logarithm of heterogeneity value of the same size star network Hs  as 
shown below: 
                            h l o g ( H ) l o g ( H ) s r                      (5) 
 
Probability of being fake news. Here we use ratio of layer sizes as an example. We 
divide ratio of layer sizes into 𝑛 portion. In the ith portion, the probability of being 
fake news is: 
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𝑝𝑖
𝑓
: The probability of fake news in the ith portion (the number of fake news in this 
portion divided by the total number of fake news). 
𝑝𝑖
𝑟: The probability of real news in the ith portion. 
 
Significance of difference. When we distinguish fake news from real ones using 
topological measures such as ratio of layer sizes or the characteristic distance, it is 
important to know the significance of difference. Here we use ratio of layer sizes as 
an example. First, we rank the Weibo propagation networks by their ratio of layer 
sizes ignoring their types (fake or real). Second, we randomly split these propagation 
networks into n portions which have same number of networks. Finally, we calculate 
the difference significance using following formula: 
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𝑛: The number of portions that we divide. 
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Figures 
 
Figure 1. Typical examples of fake and real news networks. (A) Schematic 
diagram of the propagation of a post and its re-posting. The nodes represent the users 
and the edges are the re-postings. The directionality determines which user is the 
re-poster among the two users: the origin is the former re-poster and the target is the 
later re-poster. In this example, there are five users in which one user is the creator, A, 
who publishes the first post and the other four users repost on this topic. Re-poster B 
and re-poster C reposts directly from the creator, A, while D reposts C and E reposts 
D. A layer consists of re-postings whose re-posters have the same distance from the 
creator. We color the edges according to their layer from light to dark blue. (B) A real 
typical Weibo network of fake news with 1123 nodes. The edge’s arrow stands for its 
direction. This network of Weibo is a fake news about health problems due to a milk 
tea shop. (C) A typical Weibo real news network with 215 nodes. This network of 
Weibo is about a tip of prevent sunstroke. (D) A typical Twitter fake news network 
with 199 nodes. This tweet is about an electric store that raised the price of a battery 
unreasonably. (E) A typical real news network in Twitter with 578 nodes. This tweet is 
a correction tweet against fake news about Cosmo oil by Asahi newspaper. We 
applied the Fruchterman-Reingold layout by using Pajek software here. 
 
 
  
  
Figure 2. Different layer sizes grow with time in typical networks. The y axis is 
the cumulative number of re-postings at different layers of typical networks in Weibo 
and Twitter. The x axis is the time (in hours) from the time of news creation and the 
different colors stand for different layers. Shown examples are (A) fake news and (B) 
real news in Weibo, as well as (C) fake news and (D) real news in Twitter. In Fig. 2A, 
the fraction of nodes located in the first layer is around 45% of all the nodes at the end 
of propagation. However, in Fig. 2B, the total number of nodes in the first layer 
occupies about 78% of all the nodes at the end of propagation. If the total number of 
nodes does not change much after 20 hours, we ignore the re-posting after 20 hours in 
order to clearly see the layers in the figure. These four typical networks are the same 
networks shown in Fig. 1. It is seen that the layer sizes of real news and fake news are 
significantly different in both Weibo and Twitter. Real news networks tend to have a 
relatively larger first layer, while fake news networks are relatively uniformly 
distributed in different layers. 
  
 Figure 3. Ratio of layer sizes differentiates fake news from real news. The 
distribution of ratio of layer sizes and its development after a period of time can 
differentiate fake news from real news. These differences appear already after a few 
hours. (A) The PDF of all re-postings in the first five layers averaged over all of the 
Weibo propagation networks. The p-value of Mann-Whitney is below 0.01. (B) The 
PDF of all re-postings in the first five layers in all networks of Twitter. The p-value of 
Mann-Whitney is below 0.01. (C) Distribution of ratio of layer sizes at five hours 
from the first re-posting. The ratio of layer sizes is the size of the second layer divided 
by the size of the first layer. The p-value of Mann-Whitney between fake and real 
news is below 0.01. This figure considers 1682 fake news, 492 real news and 51 real 
news with non-official creator at five hours from the first re-posting. (D) Distribution 
of ratio of layer sizes of all re-postings for the whole lifespan. The p-value between 
fake and real news is below 0.01. Here we consider all available Weibo propagation 
networks (1701 fake news, 492 real news and 51 real news with non-official creator 
networks). 
  
 Figure 4. Characteristic distance differentiates fake news from real news. (A) The 
PDF of distances for three typical examples of networks for both fake and real news 
in Weibo. (B) The PDF of distances for all real and fake news networks in Weibo. (C) 
The PDF of distances of all real and fake news networks in Twitter. (D) The PDF of 
the characteristic distances (details in methods) for fake news and real news. The 
p-value between fake and real news is below 0.01.  
  
 Figure 5. Heterogeneity measure for fake and real news in Weibo and Twitter. (A) 
The x axis is the size of the propagation network, and the y axis is the heterogeneity 
measure of the networks. The black line is the value of the star layout. The h is the 
difference of heterogeneity value between a real network and the corresponding value 
of star layout. (B) The scatter plot like in (A) for Twitter. (C) Distribution of h at five 
hours from the first re-posting of the Weibo propagation networks. The p-value here is 
below 0.01. (D) Distribution of h of all re-postings in Weibo for the whole lifespan. 
The p-value is below 0.01.  
  
 Figure 6. Heterogeneity measure show high difference between fake news and real 
news of Weibo in its early stage of propagation. (A) Probability of being fake news at 
five hours. The three vertical lines divide the figure into four parts with equal number 
of networks. For example, the area on the left of the first left line has 25% of all the 
Weibo propagation networks. (B) Probability of being fake news for the whole 
lifespan. (C) The difference significance between fake news and real news for the 
whole lifespan.  
  
Tables 
Table 1: Number of users and networks for different propagation networks  
 Fake news Real news 
Weibo users in the whole dataset 973,391 347,401 
Twitter users in the whole dataset 105,335 133,109 
Number of Weibo propagation networks (larger 
than 200 re-postings) 
1701 492 
Number of Weibo propagation networks which 
can be studied at five hours (larger than 200 
re-postings) 
1578 448 
Number of Twitter propagation networks (larger 
than 200 re-postings) 
27 28 
 
Table 2: Comparison between three methods 
Measure 
Difference significance of Weibo 
Whole lifespan Five hours Non-official creator 
Ratio of layer sizes 75.0% 74.4% 74.0% 
Characteristic 
distance 
74.6% 73.0% 70.1% 
Heterogeneity(h) 78.2% 74.1% 71.3% 
*The Weibo networks are from the first Weibo datasets in these two tables. 
